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YOU WON’T HARM ME IF YOU FOOL ME
FEDERICO ECHENIQUE AND ERAN SHMAYA
Abstract. A decision maker faces a new theory of how certain
events unfold over time. The theory matters for choices she needs
to make, but possibly the theory is a fabrication. We show that
there is a test which is guaranteed to pass a true theory, and which
is also conservative: A false theory will only pass when adopting it
over the decision maker’s initial theory would not cause substantial
harm; if the agent is fooled she will not be harmed.
We also study a society of conservative decision makers with
different initial theories. We uncover pathological instances of our
test: a society collectively rejects most theories, be they true or
false. But we also find well-behaved instances of our test, collec-
tively accepting true theories and rejecting false. Our tests builds
on tests studied in the literature in the context of non-strategic
inspectors.
Keywords: Conservatism, Testing, Strategic Expert, Merging of
Opinions
1. Introduction
An agent makes decisions about events that unfold over time: to fix
ideas, suppose she is trading in the stock market. The agent has a pre-
existing belief about stock-market prices, beliefs which would lead her
to adopt a certain contingent plan of actions (trades). Assume that the
agent learns about a new theory of stock market prices. If she believes
the theory, she should adopt a different contingent plan. The agent
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faces a problem, should she adopt the theory or stick to her original
beliefs?
We study agents who are conservative, in the sense that they are
inclined to distrust the new theory, and follow their pre-existing beliefs.
We show that, conservatism notwithstanding, agents can follow the
new theory if they at the same time test it. When the theory is correct
it is guaranteed to pass the test, and the agent reaps the benefits of
following the optimal action. When the theory is incorrect, it will only
pass the test when the resulting actions are not too suboptimal under
the agent’s pre-existing beliefs. We say “not too suboptimal” here to
mean that in the limit, for arbitrarily patient agents, there is no loss
in following an incorrect theory.
Thus the agent can be true to her conservative inclination, but follow
the new theory. Under her pre-existing beliefs, she does not loose too
much when the theory passes the test, even when the agent is fooled,
i.e. when an incorrect theory passed the test. At the same time, she
avoids the standard cost of conservatism—the cost of rejecting correct
new theories. When the theory fails the test the agent knows that it
is false. She can, for example, demand a restitution, or not trust the
source of the theory in the future.
Our test has implications for a society of conservative agents with
different initial beliefs. While each individual agent is assured that
a true theory will pass her test with probability 1, it may be that
for any given realization of stock market prices, a true theory would
fail the tests of (in a sense) most agents. In fact, for some instances
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of conservative tests, most theories—whether true or false—fail most
agents’ tests at all outcomes.
We then present a conservative test that does not have this problem:
A true theory will almost surely pass the tests of most agents. More-
over, there is an instance of conservative test which, in addition, is not
manipulable: If the theory is a fabrication of a false expert then such
a manipulation will not be successful.
Testing an expert. Our paper is closely related to the literature on
testing experts. The expert presents a theory, and claims it is the true
probability law governing some events that unfold over time; e.g. the
weather or the stock market. The expert may be true, and report the
actual law, or false, and be completely ignorant about the actual law.
One would like to test the expert’s report using the observed data.
In certain environments, one cannot design a test which (a) the true
expert is guaranteed to pass and (b) the false expert cannot manipulate
(Foster and Vohra, 1998; Lehrer, 2001; Olszewski and Sandroni, 2007b,
2008; Shmaya, 2008).
We depart from the literature by modeling why one would want to
test the expert: the expert’s report matters for an agent’s decisions.
More specifically, we assume that the decision maker is engaged in a
repeated situation of decision under uncertainty, so that in each period
he has to choose an action and get payoffs that depend on the action
and the realized state of nature. After seeing the report, the agent
has to choose a contingent plan of actions. If she believes the expert,
a certain contingent plan is optimal. If she does not believe him, an
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alternative plan, based on some given beliefs about the outcome, is
optimal.
We show that there is a test such that (a) the true expert is guaran-
teed to pass and (b’) the false expert can only pass when following his
recommendation would not have lead to a significantly worse decision
than ignoring it. So, while our test is manipulable in the sense that a
false expert can easily pass it; the agent, if fooled into passing a false
expert, is not harmed.
In addition, we consider an expert reporting to a society of agents (a
guru). We show that there are tests satisfying (a) and (b’) at the level
of individual agents, but with very different implications for the society.
One test fails most experts in the aggregate, whether they are true or
not. Another test passes true experts in the aggregate, while being
resistant to manipulation: A false guru can fool each agent separately,
but he cannot fool a large set of agents.
The idea of using experts’ prediction in decision making goes back
at least to Hannan’s no-regret theorem (Hannan, 1957). In Hannan’s
setup, a decision maker who is engaged in a repeated decision making
situation gets advice from a finite set of experts. Hannan proves that
the decision maker has a mixed strategy for choosing between the ex-
perts that guarantees that, in the long run, the DM will achieve no less
than she could achieve by following a single expert in all periods.
Olszewski and Peski (2008) also consider an agent who uses an ex-
pert’s advice in a decision-making model. In their model, the decision
maker has no initial belief over the process of outcomes, but she has
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a default action she plans to take in the absence of any expert. They
show that there is a contract between the decision maker and the ex-
pert that enables her to extract the full surplus of the expert’s service:
She always achieves at least as much as she would get if she followed
her initial plan, and if the expert is true, she receives at least the payoff
she would get if she knew the distribution and acted optimally.
We emphasize two major differences between our result and Han-
nan’s no-regret theorem and Olszewksi and Peski’s model. First, our
model is more similar to the expert testing literature in that we reach
a verdict about the expert’s competence, passing a true expert almost
surely. Second, our test is based only on the expert’s prediction and
the realized outcomes and is independent of the agent’s payoff function.
On the other hand, while Hannan’s no-regret theorem and Olszewsik
and Peski’s model guarantee no regret over any realization of the un-
derlying uncertainty, in our model the decision maker is not harmed
according the her own initial beliefs.
Four additional papers are closely related to ours. First, Al-Najjar
and Weinstein (2008) and Feinberg and Stewart (2008) study testing
of multiple simultaneous experts. One can think of our agent’s pre-
existing beliefs as a competing expert’s theory. The closest paper is
Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s: they assume that one of the experts is
true, and show that there is a test that only fails to single out the
true expert when the different experts’ predictions become close over
time. This conclusion is similar to ours, in the sense that an agent
following the recommendations of two experts who pass Al-Najjar and
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Weinstein’s test would eventually make similar decisions. In fact, we
show in Section 4 that one instance of our test is formally similar to
Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s. One difference between the two is that, in
our context, Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s test is not guaranteed to pass a
true expert. This issue is irrelevant in their model, as they want tests
which single out a true expert when one is known to be present.
Finally, our tests in Section 4 build directly on the tests in Dekel and
Feinberg (2006) and Olszewski and Sandroni (2007a); we show how one
can combine the idea in our conservative tests with their tests to obtain
tests with certain desirable properties in the society.
2. Model and Notation
The primitives of our model are (Z,A, r, λ, pi):
• Z is a finite or countable set of outcomes equipped with the
discrete topology; let Ω = ZN be the set of all sequences in Z.1
• A is a finite set of actions.
• r : Z × A→ [0, 1] is a payoff function.
• λ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
• pi is a probability measure over Ω; pi represents given beliefs
about Ω.
At every period n a decision maker (DM) chooses an action an ∈ A
and receives payoff r(zn, an), where zn is the outcome of that period.
1We endow Ω with the product topology and the induced sigma algebra B of Borel
sets.
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The resulting discounted payoffs are
(1− λ)
∞∑
n=0
λnr(zn, an).
Let Z<N =
⋃
n∈N Z
n be the set of finite sequences of elements of Z,
including the empty sequence e. For ω = (z0, z1, . . . ) ∈ Ω and n ∈ N,
let ω|n = (z0, . . . , zn−1) be the initial segment of ω of length n. In
particular ω|0 = e. For s ∈ Z
<N and ω ∈ Ω we write s ⊆ ω if s = ω|n
for some n. For s ∈ Z<N let Ns = {ω ∈ Ω|s ⊆ ω}.
A (pure) strategy is given by f : Z<N → A: f(z0, . . . , zn−1) is the
action taken by the DM after observing (z0, . . . , zn−1).
For ω = (z0, z1, . . . ) ∈ Ω and a pure strategy f : Z
<N → A let
(1) Rλ(ω, f) = (1− λ)
∑
n∈N
λnr (zn, f(z0, . . . , zn−1))
be the discounted payoff to the DM who uses strategy f when the
realization is ω. Say that f is ν-optimal iff
f ∈ argmax
∫
Rλ(ω, g)ν(dω),
where the maximization above is over strategies g.
We denote the set of all probability measures over Ω by ∆(Ω), and
endow it with the weak∗ topology.
A probability measure ν ∈ ∆(Ω) is a theory. A test function is
a function T : ∆(Ω) → 2Ω: a theory ν is accepted if the observed
realization of outcomes is in T (ν). A test function T is type-I error free
if ν(T (ν)) = 1 for every ν ∈ ∆(Ω).
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3. Individual Conservatism
We start with an interpretation of conservatism, then present our
results.
Consider the first diagram in the figure below. Suppose the out-
come of interest is a set Ω of infinite sequences of stock market prices,
z0, z1, . . ., drawn from a probability law µ. Before any zn has been real-
ized, an expert claims that the probability law ν governs the realization
of prices over time; the expert’s report may or may not coincide with
µ. A test for the expert prediction is a set of outcomes z0, z1, . . . for
which one decides that the expert has reported the true law.
report: ν
z0, a0 z1, a1 z2, a2 . . .Expert
z0 z1 z2 . . .Expert
report: ν
Drawn from µ.
Criteria: ν or pi ?
We study the situation in the second diagram: A decision maker
(DM) sees the expert prediction ν and has to choose, at each n an
action an. DM has payoffs that depend on the sequences of outcomes,
(zn) and of actions (an). So she cares about the expert’s report because
it matters for the decision she has to make. If she believes the report
is true, she should base her decisions on ν. If she believes it is false,
she has some (given) pre-existing beliefs pi about the outcomes.
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DM is ignorant about µ so she has two criteria on which to base
her choices: ν or pi. A contingent plan fν is optimal if ν were true;
fpi is optimal if DM rejects ν and uses pi. Evidently, fν is better than
fpi if DM knew the expert’s report to be true. Roughly speaking, our
notion of conservatism is that the agent would instinctively prefer to
stick with her initial belief and therefore follow fpi if the expert is false.
We show that there is a test such that, on outcomes for which ν
passes the test, fν is at least as good as fpi under either of the two
criteria DM might use.
One way to think of the result is that DM is conservative. She realizes
that ν might be false, and is concerned about outcomes where fν leads
to very different payoffs than fpi. She might want to reject ν on such
outcomes. Our test assures DM that she can satisfy this conservative
inclination, while getting the benefit of higher payoffs from following
the true expert when ν is true.
Formally, we work with the following notion of conservatism.
Definition. Let pi ∈ ∆(Ω). A test function T is pi-conservative if
(2) lim sup
λ→1
∫
T (ν)
(Rλ(ω, g)−Rλ(ω, f)) pi(dω) ≤ 0
for every ν ∈ ∆(Ω), every payoff function r : Z ×A→ [0, 1], and every
ν-optimal strategy f and pi-optimal strategy g, where R is given by (1).
Remark. Our definition of conservatism is independent of the payoff
function r and of the optimal strategies f and g. For a fixed payoff
function r, one might want to consider a test in which the decision
maker accepts a theory on a sequence of outcomes by comparing the
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payoff she would get on that realization if she played according to
some ν-optimal strategy f to the payoff she would get playing some
pi-optimal strategy g. Such a test might not satisfy (2) if we replace
the optimal strategies f and g.
Theorem 1. Let pi ∈ ∆(Ω), and let Tpi be the test that is given by
(3)
Tpi(ν) =
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣sup
n
ν(z0) · ν(z1|z0) · . . . ν(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
pi(z0) · pi(z1|z0) · . . . pi(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
<∞
}
,
where ν(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1) and pi(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1) are the forecasts made
by ν and pi about zn given z0, . . . , zn−1. Then Tpi is pi-conservative and
type-I error free.
Remark. The test (3) is prequential, i.e. depends only on forecasts
along ω = (z0, z1, . . . ).
Remark. The test (3) is similar to the test defined by Al-Najjar and
Weinstein (2008), which accepts ν on
{
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣sup
n
ν(z0) · ν(z1|z0) · . . . ν(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
pi(z0) · pi(z1|z0) · . . . pi(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
< 1
}
.
Note that their test can reject a true expert: If pi is absolutely contin-
uous w.r.t ν then the expert is rejected on the points where 1 < dpi
dν
.
On the other hand, Al-Najjar and Weinstein’s test satisfies uniform
convergence in ν in (2).
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Section 6, as are all proofs in the paper.
The proof relies on the fact that for pi-almost all outcomes on A, the
posterior distributions of ν and pi converge as n grows, and at the same
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time ν(Tpi(ν)) = 1. We prove this assertion using Blackwell-Dubins
merging theorem.
4. Implications of conservatism for the society.
In this section, we consider a society of decision makers, each has
her own initial belief, and each uses a conservative test. We identify
the decision maker with her initial belief, so the set of decision makers
is given by ∆(Ω).
We show that the collective response of the society to new theories
can depend on the choice of individual tests. Concretely, we present
three instances of conservative test. The first instance results in a
society which accepts an expert only when the realization is an atom of
his forecast: Note that at the individual level, a true theory is accepted
with probability one. But in this instance of the test, the true expert
is rejected, save for exceptional circumstances. Our second instance
is a society which always accepts a true expert with probability 1, so
the individual property of being type-I error free aggregates. Our third
instance satisfies all the desirable properties of the second instance and,
in addition, cannot be manipulated.
The tests in Instance 2 result from combining the ideas in our con-
servative tests with the test in Dekel and Feinberg (2006), while the
tests in Instance 3 use the test in Olszewski and Sandroni (2007a).
We assume that every DM pi ∈ ∆(Ω) has a test Tpi : ∆(Ω) → 2
Ω.
To emphasize the dependence on pi we sometimes use the term indi-
vidual test for Tpi. A collection {Tpi}pi∈∆(Ω) of individual tests is called
a collective test.
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We use the notions of meager and residual sets as small and large
sets, respectively: a set is meager if it is contained in a countable
union of closed sets which has empty interior. A set is residual if its
complement is meager.
Definition. Let ν ∈ ∆(Ω) be a theory and ω ∈ Ω a realization. Then
ν is collectively accepted over ω if the set of DM who accept ν, Pν,ω =
{pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|ω ∈ Tpi(ν)}, is residual. Say that ν is collectively rejected
over ω if the set Pν,ω is meager.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the individual tests Tpi are type-I error free.
Then for every theory ν and every atom ω of ν, ν is collectively accepted
over ω.
So an expert is always accepted by the society if the realization is
an atom of his forecast. In particular, if ν is atomic then
ν({ω|ν is collectively accepted over ω}) = 1,
so a true expert that reports an atomic distribution is collectively ac-
cepted with probability 1.
Instance 1–The society rejects the true expert when he is
not atomic. The following theorem shows the existence of society of
conservative decision makers that collectively rejects all experts that
do not gives a positive probability to the realized infinite sequence of
FOOLED, NOT HARMED 13
Theorem 2. Consider the collective tests Tpi that are given in (3).
Then a forecast ν ∈ ∆(Ω) is collectively accepted over a realization
ω ∈ Ω only if ω is an atom of ν.
Remark. Recall that by Lemma 1, if the individual tests are type-I error
free then a forecast ν ∈ ∆(Ω) is collectively accepted over a realization
ω which is an atom of ν. Thus, among all the collective tests that are
individually type-I error free, the test in Theorem 2 is the one that is
the least favorable towards gurus, be they true or false.
Instance 2 – The society always accepts a true expert.
Theorem 3. There exists a collective test {Tpi}pi∈∆(Ω) such that
(1) For every pi ∈ ∆(Ω) the individual test Tpi is conservative and
type-I error free.
(2) A true expert is collectively accepted with probability 1:
ν ({ω|ν is collectively accepted over ω}) = 1
for every ν ∈ ∆(Ω).
Instance 3 – Resistance to Strategic manipulation. Consider a
false guru, who does not know the true distribution of the process.
Such an expert can randomize a theory according to some probability
distribution ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)). In the following theorem we describe a
society that is immune to strategic manipulation by a false expert in
the sense that over a topologically large set of realization such an expert
will be almost surely rejected by the society.
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Theorem 4. There exists a collective test {Tpi}pi∈∆(Ω) that satisfies the
properties of Theorem 3 and, in addition, renders the society immune to
strategic manipulation in the following sense: For every ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)),
the set
{
ω
∣∣ζ({ν|ν is collectively rejected over ω}) = 1} is residual.
Remark. Note that a specific decision maker with an initial belief pi
can be fooled by a false guru when he reports theory pi (In which case
she will be fooled but not harmed). However, the society described
in Theorem 4 will collectively reject the false guru. He can fool one
individual, but, generically, he cannot fool them all.
5. Concluding remarks
We present a collection of tests for conservative decision makers.
The results reflect a basic criterion for conservatism: an inclination to
distrust the proposed theory. We formalize this in a minimal and non-
Bayesian model. The conservative criterion requires one to compare
payoffs with and without following the proposed theory ν. The exis-
tence of an alternative pi to ν is a requirement for modeling distrust of
ν; what would one otherwise reject ν in favor of? Thus, it is natural for
a conservative to evaluate ν according to pi. We have discussed a class
of tests (Tν) which are satisfactory for conservatives because a false ν
either fails Tν or, under pi, results in similar payoffs as pi.
Note that our decision maker is not fully Bayesian: she does not have
a prior belief about the correctness of the expert’s theory. We simply
explore the simple decisions between accepting and rejecting ν.
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6. Proofs
6.1. Preliminaries.
6.1.1. Lebesgue’s decomposition. Let pi, ν be probability measures over
Ω. pi is absolutely continuous w.r.t ν (pi ≪ ν) if ν(A) = 0 implies
pi(A) = 0. pi and µ are singular (pi ⊥ ν) if there exists B ∈ B such that
ν(B) = 1 and pi(B) = 0.
Let B ∈ B. Say that pi is absolutely continuous w.r.t. ν on B (and
write pi ≪B ν) if ν(A) = 0 implies pi(A ∩B) = 0.
Proposition 5. (Lebesgue Decomposition) Let ν and pi be two prob-
ability measures. Then pi = pi(r) + pi(s) where pi(r) and pi(s) are finite
measures such that pi(r) ≪ ν and pi(s) ⊥ ν.
Corollary 6. Let ν and pi be probability measures, pi = pi(r) + pi(s) be
the Lebesgue decomposition of pi over ν, and let B be a set such that
ν(B) = 1 and pis(B) = 0. Then pi ≪B ν.
Proof. For every A ∈ B, ν(A) = 0 implies
pi(A ∩B) = pi(r)(A ∩B) + pi(s)(A ∩B) ≤ pi(r)(A) + pi(s)(B) = 0,
as desired. 
6.1.2. Merging. For a probability measure ν over Ω and s ∈ Z<N we
let νs be the probability measure over Ω that is given by
νs(A) = ν(A|Ns) = ν(A ∩Ns)/ν(Ns)
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if ν(Ns) > 0 and defined arbitrarily if ν(Ns) = 0. The law of total
expectation says that for every n ∈ N and every bounded Borel function
R over Ω ∫
R dν =
∫ (∫
R dνω|n
)
ν(dω).
The distance between two probability measures φ1 and φ2 over Ω is
given by
d(φ1, φ2) = sup
D∈B
|φ1(D)− φ2(D)|.
Note that
(4)
∣∣∣∣
∫
R dφ1 −
∫
R dφ2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ d(φ1, φ2)
for every Borel function R : Ω→ [0, 1]. Let pi and ν be two probability
measures over Ω. We say that ν merges with pi if
(5) lim
n→∞
d(piω|n , νω|n) = 0,
for pi-almost every ω ∈ Ω. The following result was proved by Blackwell
and Dubins.
Proposition 7. Blackwell and Dubins (1962) If pi ≪ ν then ν merges
with pi
Let B ∈ B. Say that that ν merges with pi on B if (5) is satisfied for
pi-almost every ω ∈ B.
Corollary 8. If pi ≪B ν then ν merges with pi on B.
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Proof. If pi(B) = 0 then the corollary is satisfied trivially. Assume
pi(B) > 0, and let pi′ be the probability measure over Ω that is given
by pi′(D) = pi(D|B) = pi(D ∩B)/pi(B) for every D ∈ B. Then pi′ ≪ ν.
Let s ∈ Z<N and D ∈ B. Then it follows from the definition of pi′
that
pi′(D|Ns) = pi(D ∩Ns ∩B)/pi(Ns ∩B) = pi(D ∩B|Ns)/pi(B|Ns).
It follows that
pi′(D|Ns) ≥ pi(D ∩B|Ns) ≥ pi(D|Ns)− (1− pi(B|Ns)),
and
pi′(D|Ns) ≤ pi(D|Ns)/pi(B|Ns) ≤ pi(D|Ns) + (1− pi(B|Ns))/pi(B|Ns)).
Therefore d(pis, pi
′
s) ≤ (1− pi(B|Ns))/pi(B|Ns). It follows that
(6) lim
n→∞
d(piω|n , pi
′
ω|n) ≤ limn→∞
(1− pi(B|Nω|n))/pi(B|Nω|n) = 0
pi-almost surely on B since by the martingale convergence theorem
pi(B|Nω|n)→ 1B(ω).
By Blackwell-Dubins Theorem, since pi′ ≪ ν it follows that
(7) lim
n→∞
d(pi′ω|n , νω|n) = 0
pi′-almost surely on B. Since pi ≪B pi
′ it follows that (6) is satisfied
pi-almost surely on B. From (6) and (7) it follows that
d(piω|n , νω|n) ≤ d(piω|n , pi
′
ω|n) + d(pi
′
ω|n , νω|n) −−−→n→∞
0
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pi-almost surely on B, as desired. 
6.2. Proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving a proposition that
describes a class of conservative tests.
Proposition 9. Let pi ∈ ∆(Ω) and let T : Ω→ 2Ω be a test such that
pi ≪T (ν) ν for every ν ∈ ∆(Omega). Then T is pi-conservative.
Remark. It follows from Proposition 9 and Corollary 6 that there exists
a test which is pi-conservative and type-I error free.
Proof of Proposition 9. By Bellman’s principle of optimality, if f is ν-
optimal then for every s = (z0, . . . , zn−1) and every strategy g one has
∫
Ns
Rnλ(y, g)νs(dy) ≤
∫
Ns
Rnλ(y, f)νs(dy)
where for every strategy h and every ω = (z0, z1, . . . ) ∈ Ω, R
n
λ(y, h) =
(1−λ)
∑∞
k=n r(zk, h(z0, . . . , zk−1)) (an optimal strategy is optimal from
every stage onward).
By Corollary 8, ν merges with pi on T (ν). Let f be a ν-optimal
strategy and g a pi-optimal strategy. We claim that (2) is satisfied.
Indeed, let ε > 0. Let n ∈ N be large enough such that pi (T (ν) \G) < ε
where G = T (ν) ∩
{
ω
∣∣d (piω|n , νω|n) < ε}, and let 0 < Λ < 1 be large
enough such that (1 − Λn) < ε. Let λ > Λ. For ω = (z0, z1, . . . ) ∈ Ω
and a strategy h let
Rnλ(x, h) = (1− λ)
∞∑
k=n
λkr (zk, h(z0, . . . , zk−1)) .
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Then, by the choice of Λ and since r(z, a) ∈ [0, 1], it follows that
(8) 0 ≤ Rnλ(ω, h) ≤ Rλ(ω, h) ≤ R
n
λ(ω, h) + ε.
for every ω ∈ Ω and every strategy h. Now,
∫
T (ν)
Rλ(ω, g) pi(dω) <
∫
G
Rλ(ω, g) pi(dω) + ε ≤
∫
G
Rnλ(ω, g) pi(dω) + 2ε =
∫
G
(∫
Rnλ(y, g) piω|N (dy)
)
pi(dω) + 2ε ≤
∫
G
(∫
Rnλ(y, g) νω|N (dy)
)
pi(dω) + 3ε ≤
∫
G
(∫
Rnλ(y, f) νω|N (dy)
)
pi(dω) + 3ε ≤
∫
G
(∫
Rnλ(y, f) piω|N (dy)
)
pi(dω) + 4ε =
∫
G
Rnλ(ω, f) pi(dω) + 4ε ≤
∫
T (ν)
Rλ(ω, f) pi(dω) + 4ε.
The first inequality follows from the choice of n and the fact that
Rλ(ω, g) ≤ 1. The second inequality follows from (8). The first equality
follows from the law of total expectation. The third inequality follows
from the definition of G and (4). The fourth inequality follows from the
fact that f is ν-optimal and dynamic consistency. The fifth inequality
follows from the definition of G and (4). The second equality follows
from the law of total expectation. The last inequality follows from (8).
We proved that for every ε > 0 there exists 0 < Λ < 1 such that
∫
T (ν)
Rλ(ω, g) pi(dω) <
∫
T (ν)
Rλ(ω, f) pi(dω) + 4ε
for every λ > Λ. This completes the proof of the proposition. 

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Remark. Though our proof is based on Blackwell-Dubins merging the-
orem, a weaker notion of merging (Kalai and Lehrer, 1994) would have
been sufficient for our cause.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix pi, ν ∈ ∆(Ω) and let Ln : Ω→ [0,∞) be given
by
Lnpi,ν(ω) =
ν(z0) · ν(z1|z0) · . . . ν(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
pi(z0) · pi(z1|z0) · . . . pi(zn|z0, . . . , zn−1)
.
So Lnpi,ν(ω) is the likelihood ratio of pi and ν over the realization ω|n.
By (Durrett, 1996, Chapter 4.3.c) Lnpi,ν is a martingale under ν, ν(L <
∞) = 1, and the Lebesgue Decomposition (see Section 6.1.1) of pi over
ν is given by dpi(r) = Ldν and pi(s)(A) = pi(A ∩ {L = ∞}) where
L = supLnpi,ν . In particular, it follows from Corollary 6 that pi ≪T (ν) ν.
Therefore Tpi satisfies the condition of Proposition 9, and so Tpi is pi-
conservative and does not reject the truth with probability 1. 
6.3. Proofs from Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ν ∈ ∆(Ω) be a forecast and let ω be an atom of
ν. Since ν(Tpi(ν)) = 1, it follows that ω ∈ Tpi(ν) for every pi. Therefore
Pν,ω = ∆(Ω). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let ν ∈ ∆(Ω) be a theory and let ω ∈ Ω be
a realization such that ν({ω}) = 0. We claim that ν is collectively
rejected over ω. By (3)
Pν,ω =
∞⋃
M=1
∞⋂
n=1
{
pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|pi(Nω|n) ≤M · ν(Nω|n)
}
.
Since the sets Nω|n are clopen it follows that the function pi 7→ pi(Nω|n)
is continuous in the weak∗ topology and therefore the sets
{
pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|pi(Nω|n) ≤M · ν(Nω|n)
}
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are closed in the weak∗ topology and therefore Pν,ω is an Fσ set, i.e. a
countable union of closed set.
We now claim that Pν,ω has an empty interior. Indeed, let pi ∈ Pν,ω,
and let M be such that pi(Nω|n) ≤M · ν(Nω|n) for every n. Then
pi({ω}) = lim
n→∞
pi(Nω|n) ≤M · lim
n→∞
ν(Nω|n) =M · ν({ω}) = 0.
Therefore Pν,ω ⊆ {pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|pi({ω}) = 0}. The assertion that Pν,ω has
empty interior follows from Lemma 2 below. 
Lemma 2. For every ω ∈ Ω the set {pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|pi({ω}) > 0} is dense.
Proof of Lemma 2. For every µ ∈ ∆(Ω) let pin = (1 − 1/n)µ + 1/nδω
where δω is dirac measure over ω. Then pin({ω}) > 0 and pin → µ in
the norm topology, and, in particular in the weak∗ topology. 
The proof of Theorem 3 uses the following proposition.
Proposition 10. (1) (Oxtoby, 1996, Theorem 16.5)For every ν ∈
∆(Ω) there exists a meager subset F of Ω such that ν(F ) = 1.
(2) (Dekel and Feinberg, 2006, Proposition 1) For every meager
subset F of Ω the set {pi ∈ ∆(Ω)|pi(F ) > 0} is a meager subset
of ∆(Ω).
Proof of Theorem 3. For every ν ∈ ∆(Ω) let t(ν) be a meager subset
of Ω such that ν(t(ν)) = 1. For every pi ∈ ∆(Ω) let Tpi : ∆(Ω) → 2
Ω
be such that Tpi(ν) = t(ν) whenever pi(t(ν)) = 0 and Tpi(ν) is defined
arbitrary such that ν(Tpi(ν)) = 1 and pi ≪Tpi(ν) ν whenever pi(t(ν)) > 0
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(this is possible by Corollary 6). Then Tpi does not reject the truth
with probability 1, and, by Proposition 9 Tpi is pi-conservative.
Fix ν ∈ ∆(Ω) and let ω ∈ t(ν). It follows from the definition of T
that {pi|pi(t(ν)) = 0} ⊆ Pν,ω and it follows from Proposition 10 that
the set {pi|pi(t(ν)) = 0} is residual. Therefore the set Pν,ω is residual. It
follows that ν is collectively accepted over ω for every ω ∈ t(ν). Since
ν(t(ν)) = 1 the result follows. 
The proof of Theorem 4 uses the following proposition proved by
Olszewski and Sandroni (2007a).
Proposition 11. There exists a function t : ∆(Ω)→ 2Ω such that
(1) For every ν ∈ ∆(Ω), t(ν) is meager and ν(t(ν)) = 1.
(2) For every ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) the set
{
ω
∣∣ζ({ν|ω /∈ t(ν)}) = 1}
is residual.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let t : ∆(Ω)→ 2Ω be as in Proposition 11 and let
{Tpi}pi∈∆(Ω) be such that Tpi(ν) = t(ν) whenever pi(t(ν)) = 0 and Tpi(ν)
is defined arbitrary such that ν(Tpi(ν)) = 1 and pi ≪Tpi(ν) ν whenever
pi(t(ν)) > 0. Then Tpi is a version of the test constructed in the proof
of Theorem 3.
Fix a realization ω and let ν ∈ ∆(Ω) be such that ω /∈ t(ν). Then
by the definition of Tpi, Pω,ν ⊆ {pi|pi(t(ν)) > 0}. By Proposition 10 it
follows that the set {pi|pi(t(ν)) > 0} is meager and therefore the set
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Pω,ν is meager. Thus, if ω /∈ t(ν) then Pω,ν is meager, i.e. ν collectively
fails over ω. Let ζ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)). It follows from the previous observation
that, for every realization ω,
ζ({ν|ω /∈ t(ν)}) = 1→ ζ({ν|ν is collectively rejected over ω}) = 1.
Since the set
{
ω
∣∣ζ({ν|ω /∈ t(ν)}) = 1} is residual by Proposition 11 it
follows that the set
{
ω
∣∣ζ({ν|ν is collectively rejected over ω}) = 1} is
residual. 
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